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Contraceptive litigation has focused on the oral contraceptive and the
intrauterine device. Ortho Pharrnaceutical and another manufacturers have weathered numerous products liability suits over the Pill, but the class action
suits over the Dalkon Shield have driven A.H. Robins, into bankruptcy. (Isaccs
and Holt, 1987; Lincoln and Kaeser, 1988) Until last year, one contraceptive
drug received no legal attention. The drug is Depo-Provera, a three rronth
injectable developed by The Upjohn Corrg;iany. Used world-wide as a contraceptive, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has denied the drug a license for
contraceptive use, because it is a suspected carcinogen. (Green, 1987). DepoProvera is, nevertheless, widely prescribed as a contraceptive by private
physicians, family planning clinics, and mental health facilities nationwide.
Women who have used the drug have experienced a variety of adverse reactions
and have sued their physicians and Upjohn, but until ~john v. MacMurdo, all
these cases were settled or dismissed.
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Anne MacMurdo' s experience with Depo-Provera began on May 27, 1974 with
her first injection of the drug and ended on May 31, 1990, alrrost sixteen
years to the day, with the decision of the Florida Supreme Court. Her case
addresses a question conunon to all contraceptive litigation. Who shall bear
the risk of prescription drug use: the pharrnaceutical company, the physician,
or the patient? Asking this question places the MacMurdo case within the
confines of the science policy debate over the role of private litigation in
managing risk and resolving medical and products liability issues. (Huber,
1988; O'Brien, 1988) In general, this debate has condemned the vices of the
adversary process and touted the virtues of administrative regulation, but has
not given sufficient attention to a subject this paper will address: the
responsibility of fragmented system of pharmaceutical risk management for
propelling risk and liability issues into the judicial forum. In particular
this paper will analyze the MacMurdo case as a product of the failure to
manage pharrnaceutical risk.
Part I will rely upon the Senate and House hearings in 1973 and 1974 to
explore the risk management attitudes and actions of the prescription drug
system's three major participants --the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ,
The Upjohn Company, physicians in private practice, and family planning clinics-- at the time that Anne MacMurdo received her injections of Depo-Provera.
These hearings exposed the fragmented character of pharmaceutical risk manage. ment: the FDA' s lack of authority over pharrnaceutical marketing and physician
prescribing of drugs for unapproved uses, Upjohn's failure to control its
marketing to Depo-Provera's approved uses, and physicians' failure to provide
women with information about the drug's FDA status and the risks its use poses
to their personal health. As a consequence, these hearings concluded that
fragmented drug risk management made it virtually impossible for women to make
an informed choice about the use of a contraceptive drug.
Part II will examine the judicial response to this risk management failure in terms of Anne MacMurdo's suit against Upjohn. other women who have had
adverse reactions to the drug and who have sued her physician and Upjohn have
had their cases either a settled or dismissed. Anne MacMurdo' s case was tried
and appealed all the way to the Florida Supreme Court. As a consequence, it
provides the fullest opportunity to examine the judicial assessment of the
drug'.s risk and the assigrurent of liability for its adverse effects. To this
end, Part II will explore the use of the law of negligence, the rules of civil
procedure, and the adversary process to assess contraceptive risk. In the end,
it will find that the MacMurdo case failed to manage risk not solely because
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of these features of civil litgation, but because of the Florida's Supreme
Court's result-oriented decision.
Part III will explore the lessol)S of Depo-Provera's unapproved ,use for
the debate over the judicial role in assessing risk and assigning liability.
Part III will argue that Depo-Provera' s unapproved use experience · docuroents
the failure of not only the prescription drug system to manage contraceptive
risk, but also the limited utility of the judicial system to corrpensate victims and prevent future adverse prescription drug reactions. In this regard,
Upjobn v MacMurdo is likely to undersevedly insulate phannaceutical companies
from products liability suits and may errbolden them to support.national products liability·· legislation which may make it more difficult for consuroers
injured by defective products to collect damage awards.
I.

Prescription Drug Risk Management
Prescription drug use is based on decisions abcut risk made by the FDA,
pharmaceutical corrpanies, physicians, and patients. In 1974, Depo-Provera was
readily available, because of the FDA' s limited authority to control the
drug's nonapproved use, Upjohn's unwillingness to limit Depo-Provera's sale to
its approved use, and physicians' freedom to make a professional judgment
about the drug's contraceptive use.
'.Ille. fQQQ. filld. .!mJ.9. Administration

Risk management is initially a matter for the FDA. Under the the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 and its amendrrents, the FDA has the drug
licensing authority to make an initial judgment about a drug's availablity and
use. The FDA' s pre-market screening process begins when a pharmaceutical manufacturer submits an Investigational New Drug Application. IND approval permits
the manufacturer to conduct preliminary tests. If the tests suggest the drug
will be safe and effective, the manufacturer submits a fonnal license application, the New Drug Application (NDA), which includes reports of its animal and
human studies. FDA approval permits the phannaceutical company to market and
physicians to prescribe the drug for specific medical p.i.rposes. As part of its
NDA approval action, the FDA also accepts the official label or package insert
which contains a statement of and instructions for the drug's approved use(s).
What contraceptive risk management decisions has the FDA made on DepoProvera? The FDAgranted Upjohn experimental (IND) approval in 1963 to conduct
animal and huroan clinical trials to determine the drug's safety and effectiveness as a female contraceptive. Four years later, Upjohn submitted an application for marketing approval. In accordance with the NDA, Upjohn initiated two
long term animal toxicity studies in 1968 -a 7 year beagle dog study and a 10
year rhesus monkey study- and the following year, human clinical trials at 12
domestic sites and other sites overseas.
While these studies were.being conducted, Upjohn.requested the FDA to
grant Depo-Provera approval for limited contraceptive use: for womeri who found
other methods of contraception unacceptable or for women who were :mentally
retarded and institutionalized. In O::tober 9, 1973, the FDA announced its
intention to grant·Upjohn's NDA on the condition that two cautionary measures
would be eirployed to assure its proper use: fil:st, a distribution provision
which required Upjohn "to maintain a registry of physicians who have utilized
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for contraception" and, second, an informed consent provision which
that the drug package include an informational leaflet and a detailed
to explain to the patient the drug's use and risks. (Schmidt, O::tober
p. 27,940)

The FDA's proposal to approve Depo-Provera's limited contraceptive use
became the subject of congressional hearings in April 1974. When the House
Subcommittee on Intergoverrurental Relations, chaired by Representative L.H.
Fountain (D-NC) reviewed the circumstances surrounding the Cbstetrics and
Gynecology Advisory Committee's affirmative recommendation of Depo-Provera's
limited use, it found the committee was "in the unenviable position of having
to decide about the safety of the drug without the full data before it."
(House Hearings on FDA Mvisory Committees, 1974, p. 375)
The FDA, apparently undeterred by this congressional scrutiny, took the
first step in approving Depo-Provera's limited contraceptive use by issuing a
final patient .label rule on Septerrber 6, 1974. At this point, Congressman
Fountain sent a letter of protest to HEW Secretary Caspar Weinberger in which
he requested that the FDA revoke the rule because "there were many serious
and, as yet; unresolved questions concerning the drug' s safety including the
drug's role in causing cancer." (Fine, CX:tober 22, 1974, p. 36,472) FDA Commissioner Sam Fine subsequently stayed approval of the drug pending further
advisory committee review of the scientific evidence.
A lengthy internal agency review followed. In 1978, the FDA disapproved
the drug for general contraceptive marketing. Upjohn challenged the FDA's
action before a Public Board of Inquiry co~sed of three eminent scientists
appointed in 1981. The board held five days of hearings in 1983 and issued a
report in 1984 upholding the agency's 1978 decision. The FDA accepted the
report as its final decision in 1986. In sum, Depo-Provera has never been
approved for contraceptive use, but as a drug approved for at least one
medical purpose over the past thirty-one years, it has been permissible for
Upjohn to sell it and for physicians, exercising their informed medical judgment, to prescribe it for contraception. [l]
Dei;c-Provera' s Unawroved Contraceptive !1s.e.
Depo-Provera's unapproved contraceptive use first came to public attention during the February 1973 hearings on the "Q..iality of Health Care - HWMn
Experimentation" before the Senate Public Welfare SUbcommittee on Health
chaired by Edward M. Kennedy. Witnesses informed the committee that private
physicians, university hospitals, mental health physicians, and family planning clinics throughout Tennessee had used Depo-Provera as a contraceptive as
early as 1963. In fact, one witness stated: "the Tennessee Public Health
Department [currently] has a computer printout sheet indicating that between
1,000 and 1,500 women are given Dep0-Provera each year in the State." (Senate
Hearings on Health Care, 1973, p. 67) Tennessee's use of Depo-Provera for
contraceptive purposes was not, however, an isolated unapproved use of the
drug. Dr. Norman Kase, Chair of the Department of Cbstetrics and Gynecology at
Yale University School of Medicine, testified that his direct observation and
conversatibns with colleagues nationwide led him to conclude: "As a contraceptive agent • • • it is widely used throughout the country." (Senate Hearings on
Health Care, 1973, p.62) Depo-Provera's nationwide use led the committee to
examine in detail the risk management attitudes and practices of Upjohn in
marketing the drug and physicians in using it for contraception.
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The Upjohn Company
Pharmaceutieal companies manage risk in physician use of their drugs by
means of package inserts. The insert describes the drug, identifies the drug's
FDA approved uses (indications), disapproved uses (contraindications), warnings and precautions in its use, and adverse reactions associated with its
use. Since 1974, the Depo-Provera package insert has stated that the drug is
approved only as chemotherapy for terminal endometrial cancer. Under the
warning heading,·the 1974 package insert had stated: "The use of De:i;:o-Provera
(medroxyprogesterone acetate) for contraception is investigational since there
are unresolved_questions relating to its safety for this indication. Therefore
it is not an approved -indication for this purpose." Finally the package insert
lists the following adverse reactions: breakthrough bleeding, spotting, and
change in menstrual flow.
What responsibility does a pharmaceutical company have where a drug is
used in an unapproved manner? In his testimony at the Senate hearings, Dr.
William N. Hubbard, Jr., an Upjohn Executive Vice President, stated that even
though the company had met its responsibility in the case of De:i;:o-Provera,
because the package insert was FDA approved, it had taken additional measures:
its promotional materials for De:i;:o-Provera made no reference to the drug's
contraceptive use and its sales force was not permitted to initiate discussions regarding the drug's contraceptive use. If physicians wrote requesting
information on the drug's contraceptive use, he said, Upjohn "will give reference citations to the published literature • • • but will not comnent upon that
literature." (Senate Hearings on Health Care, 1973, p. 105) Beyond the use of
these rreasures, he argued, Upjohn had been careful in monitoring its marketing
of De:i;:o-Provera, because "it would be inappropriate for the company to supply
the drug directly to physicians who had declared their intention to use it for
an unapproved use." (Senate Hearings on Health Care, 1973, p.105) Upjohn also
recognized that there were medical professional limits to its monitoring of
unapproved drug use. "(I]f pursued too energetically [it] runs the risk of
having the coll[)aily intrude on the legal rights of the physician to utilize
medicinals as he judges to be in the best interests of his patient." (Senate
Hearings on Health Care, 1973, p. 108).
At the same time, the hearings also revealed that Upjohn' s statement of
policy was at odds with the minimal control it had. exercised over DepoProvera' s sale to Tennessee state institutions which were likely to use the
drug for its unapproved purposes. state officials testified that Upjohn had
not asked about the drug's intended use and had sent it directly to the family
planning clinics. In response, Dr. Hubbard said that many of the orders for
the family planning clinics came as "a blanket order from the state purchasing
agent," but for those which were to be sent directly to a county family
planning clinic, Upjohn had terminated these sales in late May or June 1972.
Since August 1972, he said, the coll[)aily's marketing groups were told ,to be "on
the lookout • • • for orders from any source that could reasonably be inferred
as being intended for unindicated use" and to ask in the case df family
planning clinics about the drug's intended use.
(Senate Hearings on Health
Care, 1973, p. 106)
spite of these assurances, Upjohn seemed to
limit the marketing of De:i;:o-Provera to its approved
diaapproved the drug's general marketing, in part,
the labeling requirements would have limited value
In
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prescription practices and assuring patient consent. In 1984, the Public Board
of Inquiry recomnended against general approval on other grounds, but based
its disapproval of lllni.ted marketing, in part, on the absence of any effective
mechanisms to limit the drug's distribution to patients with special needs.
Even after Upjohn withdrew Depo-Provera's NDA in 1986, House hearings on the
"Use of Depo-Provera by the Indian Health Service" the next year revealed that
the company had continued to sell the drug to private physicians, mental
health professionals and family planning clinics nationwide for contraception.
Physicians and Patients
Physicians manage risk by making an informed and individualized decision
about patient use of prescription drugs.· '.lhe 1973 Senate health care hearings
disclosed that Depo-Provera's unapproved contraceptive status created a dilemma for physicians. According to Dr. lbbert Hutchinson, Assistant Cormtissioner
of the Tennessee Department of Health, family planning physicians claimed that
they had to decide whether to provide an unapproved drug in order to prevent
unwanted pregnancies by women in special circumstances or whether to allow the
women take their chances with another pregnancy. One class of worren in these
special circumstances were those who had medical contraindications to the oral
contraceptive or who had not tolerated the IUD. In resolving this dilerrma, Dr.
Hutchinson testified that physicians made risk management judgments for themselves on the basis of their own independent review of the medical literature.
In commenting upon the Tennessee Department of Health's decision to use DepoProvera, he observed: "[W] e came to realize that many of the initial reasons
for our reluctance to use the drug were being removed by medical studies"
including those by Gardner and Mitchell and by McDaniel. (Senate Hearings on
Health care, 1973, p. 83) As a consequence, Depo-Provera had "a place in our
'contraceptive cafeteria' approach to family planning [because of] ••• [t]he
simplicity of the method, the absence of any estrogenic side effects, the high
reliability, combined with good acceptability, despite the unpredictable
bleeding associated with its use." (Senate Hearings on Health care, 1973,
p.84) still Depo-Provera was not their first choice, because·of the uncertainty about the return of a woman's fertility. Dr. Kase, less generously, called
it "a tertiary drug in contraception, well below the intrauterine device."
(Senate Hearings on Health care, 1973, p.63)
The Senate hearings also disclosed that physicians failed to inform their
patients about Depo-Provera' s FDA status and its personal health risks. Anne
Burgess, a welfare mother from rural Tennessee, was the first patient to
publically address the lack of informed consent and the social welfare control
rationale for the Depo-Provera's use. She testified that she was pressured
into taking the drug "because they [the welfare office] said they would rather
pay for one child as two." (Senate Hearings on Health care, 1973, p. 59) When
she went to the health department for her injection, she testified that the
clinic doctors did not tell her Depo-Provera was unapproved for =ntraceptive
use, nor did they inform her about its side effects.
Anne Burgess' personal experience was supported by Dr. Kase who had
interviewed six women in Currberland County, Tennessee. "Informed consent," he
said, "was not obtained, nor was an attempt made to achieve patient awareness
or acceptance of this issue. In particular, the potential short and long term
hazards of the drug were not discussed" (Senate Hearings on Health care, 1973,
p. 61) even though the Depo-Provera consent form specifically mentions two
major known side effects: "(a) an irregular menstrual pattern following the
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shot which sometimes leads to periodic heavy bleeding during the first few
months, or no m:mthly periods while on the shot.· (b) a possibility of a delay
in the ability . to have children following discontinuation of this shot."
(Senate Hearings on Health care, 1973, p.108)
Dr. Hutchinson agreed that the women who signed the consent form did not
know that Depo-Provera was not approved by the FDA for contraception, 'nor did
they know the value of the drug as opp:>sed to its side effects. "[T]hey will
not know of it if the clinic physician has not explained it to them, but," he
added, "we have advised them to explain it." (Senate Hearings on Health care,
1973, p. 87) Dr. Hutchinson acknowledged, however, that the FDA's O:::tober 1972
revision of Depo-Provera's package insert, based on the evidence that the drug
had induced breast cancer in beagle dogs did have an irrpact on its .use in
Tennessee: "patient load had droH?ed from 1,400 to 942." (Senate Hearings on
Health care, 1973, p. 90)
Since 1973, physician attitudes and informed consent practices have not
changed. House hearings on the "Use of Depo-Provera by the Indian Health
Service" in 1987 disclosed that physicians in private practice and family
planning clinics have continued to prescribe Depo-Provera, but its contraceptive use was not limited to poor women with special needs. Informed consent
continued to be a problem, because Depo-Provera's side effects, if mentioned
to the patient at all, were misrepresented. If consent forms were used, they
· were often incomplete or contained editorial comments.

The 1973 Senate and 1974 House hearings exposed the fragmented character
of pharmaceutical risk management by the FDA, Upjohn, and physicians. Those
hearings made clear that the FDA was a licensing agency which had limited
direct control over pharmaceutical marketing and physician prescription practices, that Upjohn had made Depo-Provera available for nonapproved contraceptive use, and that physicians failed to provide women with information about
the drug's FDA status and the risks its use posed to their personal health. As
a consequence, Anne B..lrgess and other women who were injected with DepoProvera were not able to make informed contraceptive choices.
II.

Judicial Risk Management of Prescription Drugs:
The case of Qpjohn v. MacMurdo (1990)
The 1973 Senate hearings raised two legal questions about Depo-Provera's
unapproved contraceptive use. First, what is Up john' s legal duty in the sale
of Depo-Provera for contraceptive use? What risks does Upjohn have a duty to
disclose in the package insert? Second, what is the legal duty of physicians
who prescribe Depo-Provera for contraception? What risks do physicians have a
duty to disclose to their patients to enable them to give their 'informed
consent to the unapproved use of a prescription drug? If a woman believes she
has been harmed by the use a drug, because of the manufacturer's failure to
warn· her physician, her legal remedy is a products lianility suit. If, however, her physician has failed to provide her with the information pecessary
to make an informed personal judgnent, her renedy is the medical malpractice
suit. These two remedies are legal risk management means which women· may use
to target the failure of two critical linkages in the pharmaceutical risk
management system: the package insert and informed consent.
6

Anne Burgess was the first woman to publically report the side effects
she experienced from Dep:r-Provera: nervousness and excessive bleeding for
three to four weeks. She took no legal action. Gloria Popham, Secundina Perez,
and Monica Shannon, am::mg others, have sued their physicians and Upjohn, but
their cases were either dismissed or settled. Anne MacMllrdo's case is the only
Dep:r-Provera case to be tried and decided on the merits and to be reviewed on
the merits by a state supreme court. Her case is, therefore, the first opportunity to fully explore how the law of negligence, the rules of civil procedure, and the adversary process function to manage Dep:r-Provera's contraceptive risk prior to trial, during trial, and on ar:peal. [2]
Anne MacMurdo' s legal odyssey began on May 27, 1974 when she visited Dr.
Donald Levy, an OB/GYN at the Ochsner Clinic in New Orleans. At the time, she
was 23 years old and unmarried. - She was bleeding from an IUD which had to be
removed and alternative forms of contraception considered. Having read the
package insert, Dr. Levy knew that Dep:r-Provera was still being investigated
for contraceptive use. Nevertheless, he prescribed a 250 mg injection to
control her bleeding and for contraception, because she had previously experienced adverse reactions to oral contraceptives. The first injection acted as
expected and caused amenorrhea for approximately 90 days. On August 15, 1974,
Anne Macl'rurdo visited Dr. Arthur Shapiro, an OB/GYN at the University of
Miami's Family Services Clinic. Dr. Shapiro, knowing that Depo--Provera was not
FDA approved for contraception, but aware that she had previously received the
drug from Dr. Levy, administered a second injection. This tirre, she experienced a totally different reaction: she had continuous heavy rrenstrual bleeding.
At first, she attenpt.ed to control her bleeding though nutrition, but that did
not help. Four months later, she returned to Dr. Levy and on January 7, 1975,
he performed a hysterectomy. Why the operation was performed came to be a
central feature of her lawsuit.
Ann MacMurdo did not take legal action irrrnediately even though "she began
to read information concerning • . • Dep:r-Provera, sometime in the months following her hysterectomy, [and concluded] that her injuries \¥ere the direct
result of her ingestion of the drug." (Am;nded Complaint, January 11, 1979,
p.4) When she filed a complaint on May 19, 1978, she had waited too long to
bring a medical malpractice action against either physician. IDuisiana's and
Florida's statutes of limitations had run after one year. Her complaint against Dr. Shapiro, the University of Miami, and Upjohn, grounded on the legal
theories of negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty of merchantability, claimed unspecified corrq;iensatory damages for her dysmenorrhea and
hysterectomy and $1 million in punitive damages.
Dr. Shapiro and the University of Miami denied that they were sellers of
Dep:r-Provera and claimed that she was comparatively negligent. Upjohn asserted
that it had no informed consent obligation to Anne MacMurdo and that any harm
she suffered was due to either her assumption of the risk and/or her negligence. The defendants also brought two pretrial challenges to her complaint
which, in part, delayed a trial until 1986. Mac11urdo I (1980) addressed the
implied warranty_ of merchantability issue and MacMurdo II (1983), the products
liability issue. When the Florida courts decided these issues and later heard
her case on the merits, they made risk management judgnients: who shall bear
the risk, the pharmaceutical company, physician or patient.
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MacMµrdo l.
Anne MacMurdo's complaint did not state a claim for medical malpractice
against Dr. Shapiro and the University of Miami, because Florida's one year
statute of limitations foreclosed that claim. Instead, it claimed that.in prescribing and administering an injection of Depo-Provera, they were liable for
breach of warranty, because they had sold her a defective drug which they
warranted to be safe for her use. Moreover, they were strictly liable,: because
they did not warn her that Depo-Provera was an experimental and dangerous
drug, that she was a subject in an experimental trial of the drug, and that
she might risk serious and deleterious side effects from its use.
Dr. Shapiro and the University of Miami moved almost irnrrediately for summary judgment. [3] In Broward Circuit Ccurt, the judge treated her complaint
as a medical malpractice claim and, on the defendant's motion, dismissed the·
complaint without leave to amend "without first proceeding through medical
mediation." (MacMurdo v. Opjohn, 1980, p. 1103) MacMurdo appealed. In October
1980, a unanirrous Ccurt of Appeals acknowledged that her complaint did not
state a claim for medical malpractice, but even if it had, the Florid~ Supreme
court in Aldana v. Holub (1980) had recently declared the state's , medical
malpractice statute unconstitutional. Then the court turned to the plaintiff's
implied warranty and strict liability claims. "We are not prepared at this
stage of the pleadings," it declared, "to accept as an inevitable conclusion
that appellant will not be able to state a cause of action against the appellees on any theory." (p.1103) Rerrand was appropriate, it concluded, "to give
appellant her day in court . • • to seek redress for her injuries." (MacMurdo v.
Upjohn, 1980, p.1104)
Anne MacMurdo survived a second sunmiary judgment motion the following
October, but she was not so fortunate in September 1985 when she encountered a
motion to dismiss. Dr. Srapiro and the University of Miami claimed that her
suit was, in fact, a medical malpractice claim which was barred by Florida's
statute of limitations. The defendants persuasively argued that she had
"styled her claim as one of strict liability and breach of warranty, rather
than medical malpractice in order to avoid the Statute of Limitations for such
a cause of action
However, the· 1aw is not so easily circumvented."
(Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, September 20, 1985, p.l)
A cause of action based on breach of warranty, the defendants argued, did
not apply to the administration of drugs supplied as part of medical services
provided by a hospital and physician. Florida courts and those of other jurisdictions had recognized the distinction between sale and a service and also
recognized the distinction between the sale of goods and "the incidental
transfer of property as a necessary part of •.• [individual contracts for
professional] services."
(Memorandum, September 20, 1985, p.4) This was not,
they concluded, a sale within the contemplation of the Uniform commercial COde
and, therefore, did not give rise to a breach of warranty claim. On the issue
of strict liability, the defendants argued that the remedy was inappropriate
to impose·liability without fault when a drug· is administered as a.part of a
course of treatment. In-conclusion, the defendants cited Per1mutter v. Mb.
David HOSJ;>ital (1954), where the New York court observed: "The act of healing
frequently calls upon a balancing of risk and danger to the patient. consequently, if injury results from the course adopted, where no negligence is
present liability should not be imposed upon (one) seeking to save or otherwise assist a patient." (Mem::>randum, September 20, 1985, p.5)
B

Anne MacMurdo, perhaps recognizing that the law could not be so easily
circumvented and.aware that her implied warranty and strict liability theories
were weak, took a voluntary dismissal in Decerrber 1985. ~ the only defendant
was Depo-Provera's Il011Ufacturer: The Upjohn Company.
MacMurdo ll.
Anne MacMurdo's complaint did state a products liability claim. She
argued that Upjohn was negligent in marketing Depo-Provera and that its package insert warnings were inadequate to inform Dr. Ie.rj that the· drug could
cause dysmennorhea and heavy and prolonged bleeding. As a consequence, he
misdiagnosed her prob.lern and performed a hysterectomy. Her complaint also held
Upjohn strictly liable for her injuries, because the corrpany knew Depo-Provera
was an experimental drug with serious and deleterious side effects, but it had
failed to inform her that she was an experi.Irental subject.
Upjohn rroved for surmnary judgment. The Brooard Circuit court judge who
had two weeks before had denied Dr. Shapiro's and the University of Miami's
second surmnary judgment motion, granted Upjohn' s. At the hearing, he found the
package insert warnings adequate as a matter of law, but his conurents on his
lack of faith in the jury system, revealed the subjective basis for his
decision. "[T]he reason I love to give surmnary judgments is when you put six
people in the [jury] box, God knows what they'll come out of the [jury] room
with." (MacMurdo v. Upjohn, 1983, p.450) MacMurdo, once again, appealed.
In Decerrber 1983, Judge Walden, speaking for a divided Court of Appeals,
reversed and remanded for jury trial. "It is not for judges, but for the jury
to determine if a particular warning is adequate under the circumstances."
(MacMurdo v. Upjohn, 1983, p. 450-451) He relied initially upon the Florida
Supreme Court decision in Tam;ia l2t1lg_ ~. v. Nl!.it. (1958) which held that the
adequacy of the warning on a prescription drug label was a jury question. He
found support in .Lal>.e. v. Konstantinu (1966) where the Florida Court of Appeals, Second District, had held: "the question of the sufficiency of the
warnings of the drug's extremely dangerous potentiality and the inherent
danger in its use • • • • l!ll.!st. certainly !::>.e_ submitted tQ. ~ ~." (Maclliurdo v.
Upjohn, 1983, p. 450. Emphasis in ·original.) Judge Walden then disposed of
Upjohn' s · argument that surrmary judgment was proper, because there was no
conflicting testimony. In ~. he said, the court )1ad stated: "Florida was
cornnitted to the 'slightest doubt' rule and even though there is no conflict
in evidence, a rrotion for summary judgement should be denied where inferences
are reasonably deductable therefrom." (MacMurdo v. Upjohn, 1983, p. 451)
MacMurdo Ill
Anne MacMurdo's attorneys allowed her case to languish for over two years·
and alrrost to die in the sunmer of 1986 when Upjohn moved for summary judgment
because of her failure to respond to its expert witness interrogatories. This
motion set the stage for a series of hearings before Judge Miette Burnstein
which revived the case,· led to the appointment· of Michael Ericksen as·· her
attorney, and set a Decerrber 1, 1986 trial date.
Broward Circuit court
Anne MacMurdo' s products liability suit against Upjohn (MacMurdo III)
went to trial, as scheduled, before Judge Burnstein. The trial was grounded in
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the law of negligence. MacMurdo claimed that she suffered her injuries because
Upjohn had negligently marketed Depo-Provera and negligently failed to warn
her physicians about the drug's adverse effects. In response, Upjohn claimed
that MacMurdo was conparatively negligent. CNer three days a six member jury
heard Michael Ericksen and David Covey, Upjohn's trial counsel, sketch out
these legal theories in their opening statements, elaborate them in their
examination of witnesses, and sumrrarize them in than in their closing. argu~ts. Here in brief are their ar~ts.
Negligent Marketing
Michael Ericksen argued that pharmaceutical companies have a responsibility to limit the marketing of their products to their approved uses. Upjohn
knew of the drug's widespread unapproved contraceptive_ use. In fact, its
marketing of the drug had created "a national scandal" which became the subject of a congressional hearings in 1973. At these hearings, senators were
assured that the conpany had established a program to control the marketing of
Depo-Provera. In fact, Ericksen argued, Upjohn had only a paper program,
created at its Kalamazoo headquarters. In the Miami area, however, the failure
of its field personnel, the district sales manager and detail men, to exercise
reasonable care to implement the program had caused Anne MacMurdo's injuries.
As Mr. Ericksen observed in his closing argument: "when folks at the bottom
whose job it is to execute the program don't care
that's negligence.
(Trial transcript, p. 1026-27)
David Covey agreed that Upjohn had a responsibility to control its prescr iption drug marketing practices, but it did not have legal obligation to
police the medical profession. In the case of Depo-Provera, he argued, Upjohn
had marketed the drug responsibly. At the time Anne MacMurdo received her
shot, the drug was not sold docmestically in the 150 milligram doses used for
contraception. Nor did Upjohn fill orders coming from family planning clinics
or from physicians who suggested that they would use it as a contraceptive. In
MacMurdo's case, he further argued, the University of 1'1J.ami Family planning
Clinic had not purchased Depo-Provera, not recommended the drug to its patients, and not given it to them as a contraceptive option. Upjohn was, therefore, not negligent, because it was unable to predict that Dr. Shapiro who did
not use Depo-Provera as a contraceptive would give it to Anne MacMurdo.
Negligent Failure

.tQ

NslJ:n

Michael Ericksen argued that when Anne f'l_acMurdo received her Depo-Provera
injections in 1974, the package insert did not warn that use of the drug could
produce heavy and prolonged bleeding and dysmenorrhea (a painful and dysfunctional bleeding), but listed only spotting, breakthrough bleeding, and change
in menstrual flow (functional bleeding) as adverse reactions. Moreover, the
package insert did not state that Upjohn did not recommend the drug's contraceptive use, nor was its contraceptive use contraindicated, it merely advised
Drs. levy and Shapiro that the drug was still being investigated for contra- ceptive use anff had not yet received FDA approval. Undiagnosed vaginal bleeding was contraindicated, but Dr. levy explained that her bleeding had been
diagnosed as secondary to her IUD. In any event, neither Dr. levy, nor Dr.
Shapiro considered the package insert to be a direction from Upjohn not to
use the drug for contraception. In fact, both testified that its contraceptive
use was clearly acceptable, because there was support for such use in the
medical comnunity and medical literature.
10

Mr. Ericksen further argued that when she returned to Dr. Levy's office
in Decenber 1974 with symptoms of non-stop bleeding for four months, he was at
a disadvantage, because the package insert did not warn him that her condition
could be caused by an injection of Depo-Provera and because he did not know
what Upjohn knew: the results of a study conducted by Dr. Paul Schwaille,
Upjohn' s principal Depo-Provera researcher, which showed that in worren who had
received one injection of the drug about 33% experienced severe menstrual
bleeding, and in women who had received two injections, the figure was 23% to
27%. {Schwaille, 1973) As a consequence, Dr. Levy did not know that DepoProvera might have caused her dysmenorrhea and heavy and prolonged bleeding,
because it was supposed to have the opposite effect. If he had been warned, he
would have allowed the effects of the drug to wear off instead of performing
the hysterectomy. Thus, Mr. Ericksen argued that Upjohn was legally responsible for her injuries, because it had breached its duty to place Dr. Levy, and
also Dr. Schapiro, on notice that the use· of Depo-Provera involved the possibility of dysmenorrhea and heavy and prolonged bleeding.

David Covey argued in response that the company had taken reasonable care
to warn physicians about Depo-Provera's use. The drug's 1974 package insert
specifically stated that its contraceptive use was investigational and warned
against the injuries Anne MacMurdo claimed she suffered from the drug's use.
On cross examination, Drs. Levy and Shapiro both testified that they were
aware that the package insert contained a warning about the drug's contraceptive use and the adverse reactions Anne MacMurdo experienced. Mr.Covey admitted that the package insert did not quantify the am::mnt of bleeding to be
expected, but noted that Dr. Shapiro testified that he knew that prolonged
bleeding was a possible, but rare side effect. As a consequence, Mr. Covey
argued that the Schwaille article would have been unlikely to alter Dr. Shapiro's decision to prescribe Depo-Provera,. because it merely confirmed what he
already knew. Given this evidence, Upjohn was not liable for Anne MacMurdo's
injuries, because the warnings were adequate to inform her physicians about
the drug's adverse reactions. Instead, Mr. Covey argued, the cause of her
injuries were Drs. Levy and Shapiro's administration of Depo-Provera for
contraception in the face of clear warnings in the package insert and Dr.
Levy's performance of a hysterectomy without any evidence that the package
insert led him to misdiagnose her condition. As a consequence, Mr. Covey
concluded that if Anne MacMurdo had any legal recourse, it was a malpractice
suit against her OB/GYNs After all, Dr. Sorosh Roshan, an OB/GYN had suggested in her testimony that it was malpractice to prescri.Qe Depo-Provera. Moreover, the appropriate treatment for Anne MacMurdo' s bleeding, she testified,
was not a hysterectomy, but "iron and bedrest initially, then the use of
estrogen and finally a D&C, if the other procedures were unsuccessful." {Petitioner's Initial Brief on the Merits, 1989, p.13).
Corrq;iarative Negligence
Upjohn had claimed that even if it were liable for its failure to warn,
the danages should not include the hysterectomy, because Anne MacMurdo' s
failure to exercise the care of a reasonable person contributed to her surgery. David Covey nade two arguments to support Upjohn' s burden of proving her
corrq;iarative negligence. First, he attenpted to link her use of drugs, initially cocaine, ISD, and mescaline in the late 1960's and later her continued use
of marijuana and hashish in the early 1970's,. to her prolonged bleeding. He
also suggested that her drug use was related to her decision to have a hysterectomy, because it "severely irrq;iaired" her judgment and led to her disregard
11

"available or:portunities known by her ••• [and]. to proceed with the hysterectomy." (Reply Brief on Appeal and Answer Brief ·on Cross Appeal, 1987, p. 22)
~1:1dly, he argued that the birth of an acephalic child and her subsequent
suicide attempts provided her with a strong motivation to avoid pregnancy and
led to her snap decision to request the hysterectomy in order to' become
sterile. In conclusion, Mr. Covey suggested that she was conparatively negligent, because she did not seek a second medical opinion when she should have
knC"1n, having had a D&C to treat her bleeding from the IUD, that there were
other means short of a hysterectomy to treat her bleeding problems.
'

' .

Michael Ericksen argued in response that there was no evidence that the
effects of the recreational drugs she used would last for four years. In fact,
none, except ISD would have an effect beyond several months. There was also no
evidence . that her marijuana use contributed to her bleeding or that she knew
it would contribute to her bleeding. Furthermore, it was not contraindicated
on the package insert. All the evidence on drugs, he argued, was never· tied to
any relevant issue, because its sole puqx:ise was to prejudice his client in
the eyes of the jury. Mr. Ericksen also argued that Anne MacMurdo merely
wanted relief from her bleeding. She did not request sterilization, because
she had been informed at the genetic clinic. where she sought counseling following the birth of her acephalic child that she only had a 1 in 20 change of
bearing another child with the same defect. Her failure to know that a D&C for
her IUD bleeding would be an acceptable treatment for her Depo-Provera induced
bleeding and her failure to seek a second medical opinion was not conparative
negligence under Florida law •
.Jl.lry_

Verdict

After six hours of deliberation, a six person jury, two women and four
men, found that Upjohn was not negligent in marketing Depo-Provera, but that
it negligently failed to provide adequate warning in the drug's package insert. The jury .also found Anne 1'1.acMurdo 49% conparatively negligent and assessed her total damages at $370,000. Judge Burnstein subsequently entered a
final judgment for Anne MacMurdo in the sum of $188,700.
Florida Court of Appeals
Upjohn appealed. Anne MacMurdo cross-appealed. The Fourth District Court
of Appeals heard oral argument and rendered a decision un Decerrber 21, 1988 in
which it affinned the trial court's judgment on liability and reversed its
judgment on ccxnparative negligence. The court then remanded with instructions
to enter a judgment for. }lacMurdo for the full amount of her damages.
The court's opinion first addressed Upjohn's argument that the evidence

was insufficient to establish both the drug manufacturer's alleged failure to

adequately warn the medical corranunity that DeJ?o-Provera might cause excessive
and prolonged bleeding and the existence of a causal connection between its
failure to warn and Anne MacMurdo' s hysterectomy. Judge Anstead, speaking for
a unanimous . court, took - as .his starting point. Judge .Walden's statement . in . _.
MacMurdo II regarding the legal standard announced in ~ v. Konstantinu
(1966): the sufficiency of the manufacturer's warnings to physician~ was a
jury issue even where there was no conflicting evidence." (Upjohn v.: MacMurdo, 1988, p.339) He then approved the trial court's decision to submit the
issue to the jury, because he found that "considerable evidence presented may
have supported a verdict for Upjohn, [but] there was also substantial, evidence
12

·'

presented that the drug . • • caused MacMurdo' s bleeding problems, that the
warnings were insufficient to alert her physicians of this risk, and that her
hysterectomy was performed to treat the bleeding condition." (Upjohn v. MacMurdo, 1988, 340)
Judge Anstead then turned to Anne MacMurdo' s claim on cross-appeal that
she was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of comparative negligence.
First, he disposed of the so-called marijuana defense. At oral argument, he
observed, Upjohn' s counsel had conceded the lack of evidence connecting her
drug use to her bleeding condition. His review of the record supported that
concession. · Then he examined at length and disposed of Upjohn' s snap decision
theory, because "the jury could have inferred MacMurdo was negligent by opting
to proceed with a hysterectomy without considering available alternatives to
treat her bleeding problem." (Upjohn v. l'.acMurdo, 1988, p.340) Yet Judge
Anstead held that she had no legal duty to question her physician's advice or·
to seek a second medical opinion. Even if she had a legal duty to detennine
whether a hysterectomy was the proper treatrrent, it was error for Judge Burnstein to have submitted the issue to the jury. Upjohn had also argued that
MacMurdo had a hysterectomy, not to stop her pain and bleeding, but because
she wanted to be sterilized. However, Judge Anstead's review of Dr. Levy's
testim:lny led him to conclude: "[W]e do not believe that there was a sufficient basis in the evidence to hold that reasonable persons could differ on
whether MacMurdo voluntarily had a hysterectomy outside the context of treatment for her bleeding condition or that she had treatment alternatives available to her at the time." (Upjohn v. MacMurdo, 1988, p.341)
Florida Supreme Court
Upjohn appealed the decision. The Florida Supreme Court heard oral argument and handed down its decision on May 31, 1990. The court, 4 to 2 with one
justice recusing herself, disapproved of the Court of Appeals decision on the
negligent failure to warn issue and remanded with instructions to enter a
judgment for Upjohn. Justice Grimes, speaking for the majority, first addressed the standard which the court had recently announced in Felix v. HoffiranLaEouche In>;.. (1989) that the adequacy of a manufacturer's warning about the
dangers of a drug is frequently "'a question of fact, [but] we hold that it
can become a question of law where the warning is accurate, clear, and unambiguous' ." (Upjohn v. MacMurdo, 1990, p. 681-82) In reaching the holding, the
court disapproved not only MacMurdo II, but also the Court of Appeal_s decisions in L;ik v. Konstantinu (1966) and Ricci v. Parke Davis .&. ~- (1986)
which, according to Justice Grimes, had misread its decision in Tanpa !kl.lg_~.
v. .l:lfil..t, (1958) "to say that the adequacy of drug warnings is invariably a
jury question." (Felix v. Hoffrnan-IaRouche, 1989, p. 104).
Justice Grimes then applied the court's new standard to the question of
the sufficiency of Depo-Provera package insert warnings. His opinion began
with a sunrnary of the drug's package insert which identified breakthrough
bleeding, spotting, and change in menstrual flow as adverse reactions. "No
medical expert," he reported had "testified that the package insert· was insufficient to put a doctor on notice that the syIIq?toms displayed by MacMurdo in
January 1975 could result from the use of Depo-Provera." (Upjohn v. MacMurdo,
1990, p. 683) Justice Grimes did acknowledge that Dr. Levy's testim:lny came
close to concluding that the package insert was insufficient to warn when, as
he reported
the physician's testim:lny: "MacMurdo was suffering from dysfunctional bleeding which he [Dr. Levy] characterized as anything other than
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noanal bleeding while the package insert only referred to breakthrough bleeding and to change in menstrual flow." (Upjohn v. MacMurdo, 1990, p. 683) Yet
Justice Grimes quickly added that Dr. Levy testified he would have been warned
if he had
"had the insert in front of him when Anne MacMurdo was describing
her bleeding, he might have concluded that the drug was causing her problem."
(Upjohn v. MacMurdo, 1990, p. 683)
In sum, the Florida Supreme Court held that the expert testirrvny on the
inadequacy of the Depo-Provera package insert was insufficient to present a
jury question. As a matter of law, it held, the warnings,. per ·Felix, were
accurate, clear, and unambiguous even though the package insert did not specifically warn about excessive, continu9us, or prolonged bleedin,g, because "the
insert [had] warned of the possibility of abnormal bleeding outside the menstrual period." (Upjohn v. MacMurdo, 1990, p. 683)
Justice Shaw in his dissenting opinion condemned the court for clearly
excluding "contrary and competent substantial evidence to support the jury's
verdict" in three respects. (Upjohn v. MacMurdo, 1990, p. 683) First, the
court made highly selective use of Dr. Levy's testirrvny. As Justice Shaw
noted, the court failed to mention that Dr. Levy testified that the change in
menstrual flow [i.e. biologically functional bleeding] he would have expected
from Depo-Provera was amenorrhea. As Dr. Levy testified: "[DJ id I consider
that Depo-Provera might have been causing the dysfunctional bleeding? • • • • I
considered just the opposite •••• In fact, it usually •••• causes amenorrhea."
(Levy Deposition, 1978, p. 57-58) In reporting Dr. Levy as tesfifying that
"MacMurdo was suffering from dysfunctional bleeding which he characterized as
anything other than normal bleeding," (Upjohn v. MacMurdo, 1990, p. 683) the
majority conveniently excised the first half of the same sentence in which Dr.
Levy testified that "she was conplaining of dysmenorrhea, which is painful
menstruation." (Levy Deposition, 1978, p.41) The majority also failed to
report his testirrvny about Q<Jth synptoms in the sentence :i.rnrrediately following: "I don't see either one of these listed as an adverse reaction on the
package insert." (Levy Deposition, 1978, p.42) Second, the majority also
overlooked Dr. Shapiro's and Dr. 13enjamin' s testirrvny that the language of the
package insert was inadequate. Dr. Shapiro had testified that "the package
insert would not have put him on notice that the drug could cause prolonged
continuous bleeding." (Motion for Rehearing, 1990, p.2) Third, the majority
excused Upjohn.from failing to warn against excessive; continuous, and·prolonged bleeding in the 1974 package insert, even though Upjohn knew the results of the Schwaille study in 1971, because the prolonged bleeding was
"unpredictable and more often spotty or light." (Upjohn v. MacMurdo, 1990, p.
683, fn.4) This view of the study, Justice Shaw argued, clearly minimized the
heavy and prolonged bleeding from Depo-Provera use.
III.
Conclusion
Depo-Provera continues to be widely prescribed as a contraceptive in
spite of serious questions about its safety. The drug is readily. available
because the.Food and Drug Administration, the Upjohn Conpany, and physicians
have been unable or unwilling to limit the drug to its approved use. The
practices of these professional risk managers, examined in Part I, have,
therefore, been largely responsible for the adverse Depo-Provera reactions
women have suffered and the products liability and medical malpractice suits
they · have initiated to address the failure of two critical linkages in the
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pharmaceutical risk management system: the package insert and informed consent. Anne MacMurdo's twelve year legal odyssey, explored in Part II, documents the enonnous difficulties one Depo-Provera victim contronted in using
the courts to seek redress for her injuries and exposes the failure of the
Florida Supreme Court to manage the drug's contraceptive risk. Its decision in
!JDjohn v. ~rQQ., the first state supreme court decision on Depo-Provera's
unapproved contraceptive use, is imj;xlrtant for two reasons.
First, Upjohn has won a legal victory which may insulate it from many
future Depo-Provera products liability suits. The Florida Supreme Court's
decision suggests that Upjohn will not be held liable for its ·Depo-Provera
package· insert not characterizing the menstrual-bleeding as excessive, continuous, or prolonged. As Footnote 4 to the court's opinion states, it is
unnecessary .for Upjohn to specifically describe unpredictable and occasional
prolonged bleeding even though the Schwaille study found 25% of women who took
Depo-Provera suffered this adverse effect. Upjohn and other drug companies
will surely cite the Florida decision for the proposition that since an adverse reaction "only happens on occasion, it is not necessary to specifically
warn about it." (Motion for Rehearing, 1990, p. 6) MacMurdo will also add
substantial weight to Upjohn motions to dismiss cases based on the claim that
the Depo-Provera' s package insert warning is "accurate, clear, and unambiguous" as a mattter of law. Finally, the decision may shift Depo-Provera legal
action to physicians. If a court, for example, decides as a matter of law
that, given the facts in a particular Depo-Provera products liability case,
the package insert meets the Florida Supreme court's "accurate, clear, and
unambiguous" standard, that may encourage Depo-Provera plaintiffs to bring a
medical malpractice action.
Second, Upjohn has also won a political victory. The Florida Supreme
Court's decision may errbolden Upjohn and other pharmaceutical manufacturers
who are lobbying in Washington for the passage of products liability reform
legislation. S.1400, one of the more recent examples of conservative tort
reform, proposed to establish national rules which would make it more difficult for consumers injured by defective products to collect damage awards. One
of its provisions which shifts the burden for paying legal fees to the losing
party in a products liability case would clearly discourage women like Anne
MacMurdo. Instead of passing S. 1400, the odyssey of Depo-Provera suggests
that Congress should pass legislation which would require that a drug's nonapproved uses be clearly stated in all drug package inserts and advertisements, that drug manufacturers maintain a detailed record of drugs with nonapproved uses, and that physicians fully inform their patients by giving them
the package insert and discussing its warnings with them. (Senate Hearings on
Health care, 1973, p. 68). These suggested requirements are not newly crafted
on the basis of Anne MacMurdo' s case, but were proposed by 1-1.arcia Greenberger
of the Center for law and Policy at the 1973 Senate Hearings, a year before
Anne MacMurdo received her injections of Depo-Provera.
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ENDN'.Jl'ES

1

The FDA first approved Dep::>-Provera in 1959 to treat amenorrhea, irregular uterine bleeding, and threatened or habitual abortion and the following
year to treat endometriosis. In 1972, the FDA also approved Depo-Pi;-overa as
adjunctive therapy and palliative treatment of inoperable, recurrent, and rnetatastic errlometrial cancer. In the meantime, however, the FDA withdrew the drug's
approval for·amenorrhea and irregular uterine bleeding and in 1973 withdrew its approval
for treating endometriosis and threatened or habitual abortion.
'
2 This .analysis of wji:lhn Y..... ViacMurdo was based not only on the docwrents
cited in the text, but also upon the all pleadings, the entire tria:j. transcript, and all appellate briefs and upon interviews with Anne MacMurdo,
Michael Eriksen, her trial attorney, and Richard Kupfer, her appellate attorney.
3
Surrrnary judgment motion is granted when "there is no genuine issue of
material fact and ••• [a party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. The
motion may be entered against all or part of a claim or defense." Black's Lilli
Dictionary, 5th ed., 1980, p. 1287.
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